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ABSTRACT
Reentrancy bugs in smart contracts caused a devastating financial
loss in 2016, considered as one of the most severe vulnerabilities in
smart contracts. Most of the existing general-purpose security tools
for smart contracts have claimed to be able to detect reentrancy
bugs. In this paper, we present Clairvoyance, a cross-function and
cross-contract static analysis by identifying infeasible paths to de-
tect reentrancy vulnerabilities in smart contracts. To reduce FPs,
we have summarized five major path protective techniques (PPTs)
to support fast yet precise path feasibility checking. We have im-
plemented our approach and compared Clairvoyance with three
state-of-the-art tools on 17770 real-worlds contracts. The results
show that Clairvoyance yields the best detection accuracy among
all the tools.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smart contract applications, built upon the block-chain platform
Ethereum [1], belong to the most security-critical and data-sensitive
application category. These contracts aremainly written by a turing-
complete language Solidity. The majority of concerns on smart
contracts security begins in 2016 since a devastating financial loss
because of the DAO attack [3].
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored.
For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
ICSE ’20 Companion, October 5–11, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea
© 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7122-3/20/05.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3377812.3390908
The principal reason of this attack is due to the fallback mech-
anism. Users often misconceive that smart contracts provide se-
cure transactions and easy-to-use interfaces, by assuming that the
other side in the transaction is trustworthy. Unfortunately, this as-
sumption does not always hold. We find that attackers can write a
function call in fallback function and form an end-to-end call chain,
and execute functions in the chain without paying to the seller.
We further find that, this attack often utilizes cross-contract calls,
which are not considered by the state-of-arts. To understand the
functionality of state-of-the-art tools (e.g., Oyente [4], Securify [6]
and Slither [5]), we revisit the state-of-art available tools and find
that they have limited capability in identifying the cross-contract
reentrancy vulnerabilities. Besides, they usually focus on generic
categories of vulnerabilities, not specific to the reentrancy. Even
when this fatal vulnerability has been reported for years, it still
appears unknown why the weakness in these tools is not patched.
Overall, the existing work cannot represent the leading compre-
hension of this vulnerability, and the state-of-arts are ineffective in
identifying cross-contract reentrancy bug.
To study the essential property and various evolutions of reen-
trancy and help to ensure the smart contract security, in this paper,
we propose a more-sound cross-contract and cross-function static
analyzer. We further propose a light-weighted symbolic analysis
to help to precisely detect bugs. In summary, this paper makes the
following contributions:
• We present a large-scale empirical study to evaluate the
effectiveness of three recent general-purpose static tools
using 11714 real-world contracts from Etherscan[2].
• We present a new static reentrancy detection approach to
enable (1) more sound analysis by modeling cross-function
cross-contract behaviors, and (2) more precise analysis by
applying a light-weight symbolic analysis based on PPTs.
• Our tool, named Clairvoyance has significantly better ac-
curacy than all the other tools.
2 APPROACH
To identify cross-contract reentrancy effectively, we construct the
cross-contract call graph and CFG (named XCFG) among the in-
put smart contracts. Next, we identify the suspicious objects or
addresses, and track how they are used and propagated along the
call chain from XCFG. In this step, a path matches our criterions
will be added to the candidate pool. Meanwhile, in order to mitigate
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Figure 1: System diagram
the FPs of reported paths, we summarize 5 PPTs for reentrancy
attack by reviewing the state-of-arts detection results on 11714
contracts. For these PPTs, we define the corresponding filtering
patterns via program analysis. Finally, we filter out infeasible ways
and the remaining reachable paths are produced as results.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of our approach. In Fig. 1, each rectan-
gle represents an artifact, each ellipse represents a step (or process),
each edge represents the workflow of how a step takes some arti-
facts and outputs some new artifact. As illustrated in the diagram,
our system takes Solidity code as input, then outputs reentrancy
paths after path collecting and path filtering steps.
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY
In our empirical study, Slither [5], Oyente [4], Securify [6]
run on 11714 frequently-used real-world contracts from the well-
known third-party website Etherscan [2] for contract indexing
and browser. For the detection result, we recruit 4 researchers to
spend 2 months in reviewing the results and summarizing the pat-
terns of FPs for rules in these tools.
In our findings, these four tools are not sufficiently effective in
handling the reentrancy bug. The reason is that most of their reports
are false negatives. So as to avoid these false positives happening
to our tool, we audit incorrect reports manually and summarize the
following PPTs. The filtering pattern for PPT1 is to check whether
msg.sender is within a list of authorized contracts or addresses, or
has the permission to do this (e.g., msg.sender==owner) The filtering
pattern for PPT2 is to check whether the tainted address or object
has been initialized in declaration or modified before the external
call. The filtering pattern for PPT3 is actually applying the above
two patterns in self-defined modifiers of the function. The pattern
for PPT4 is to check the existence of the execution lock. The pattern
for PPT5 is to check the existence of checks-effects-interactions
pattern.
To make the PPT-based filtering more accurate, a light-weight
symbolic analysis is employed across PPT1-PPT4, assisting the
reentrancy detection. Our light-weight symbolic analysis leverages
the intra-procedural symbolic execution for synthesizing a symbolic
path from tainted source to the fallback call. Then we feed the path
into Z3 solver to check its feasibility. In this work, our approach is
designed to favor soundness over completeness.
4 EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of Clairvoyance, we conduct exten-
sive experiments. Specifically, we attempt to answer the research
questions: How effective are the summarized PPTs? Compared with
the three available static tools, how is the precision of Clairvoy-
ance?
The experiments are performed on 17770 new contracts obtained
from Google Big Query open dataset. Tools employed in this ex-
periment are all in their latest version. Further, Clairvoyance is
implemented in Python using 5000 lines of code, processing and
accepting SlithIR.During the evaluation, all the experiments and
tools are conducted on a machine running on Ubuntu 18.04.
For the numbers of detection results of the four static tools,
Slither reports 162 vulnerabilities in total, of which 3 reports are
true positives (TPs), while the other 159 reports are false positives
(FPs). Oyente has least 28 reports, of which 4 results are TPs, while
the rest 24 reports are FPs. Securify reports 3 TPs, but it has 605
FPs. Comparatively, Clairvoyance has outstanding precision in
this experiment, for 124 true positives in total 168 reports.
Securify, Oyente, Slither reports more bugs, but most of their
result are false positives. Comparatively, Clairvoyance has the
highest true positives. The reason behind the FPs reported by three
tools is due to the inconsideration of PPTs. In our observation:
1 Securify fails to consider permission controls, hard-coded
addresses and self-defined modifiers. It also falsely reports
the write operations after calling built-in functions send()
and transfer() as vulnerable, causing FPs since it does not
consider PPT5.
2 Oyente basically ignores the protections in self-definedmod-
ifiers and has many FPs mostly because it ignores PPT3.
3 Among all the FPs of Slither, it generally has a good sup-
port for PPT3 by considering the code of security check in
modifiers. Considering a relatively small number of cases
in using execution lock (PPT4), Slither totally ignores the
protection by execution lock(s).
4 The 44 of FPs of Clairvoyance are due to the complicated
path conditions, which cannot be easily handled by our light-
weighted symbolic analyzer.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a reentrancy detection approach based on
two steps, first applying the cross-contract static taint analysis to
find reentrancy candidates, then integrating the PPTs to refine the
results. On the publicly collected 17770 contracts, Clairvoyance
significantly outperforms the three static tools in terms of precision.
In future, we will extend our approach for other types of bugs and
also combine with dynamic approaches.
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